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ABSTRACT
The effect of state ownership on the capital structure decisions of
enterprises in selected G-20 countries is estimated using financial
and accounting data of 252 state-owned and 6503 non-state-
owned firms for the period 2011–2015. The results indicate that
state ownership is positively associated with leverage in all the
selected G-20 countries. However, this phenomenon changed
when countries were considered according to their income levels
because state-owned enterprises in high-income countries carry
more debt, while the opposite is true for lower-middle-income
countries. The results were also divergent when the effects of
various firm-specific variables were compared between state and
non-state-owned enterprises across the development spectrum.
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The idea that private ownership can perform inherently better in terms of profitabil-
ity, efficiency and constructing optimal debt than public ownership is not new. Rajan
and Zingales (1995) showed the link between ownership and capital structure deci-
sions. The study was followed by a stream of literature presenting how a firm can
benefit from state ownership.1 These benefits include easy access of politically con-
nected and state-run enterprises to debt financing (Dinc, 2004; Johnson & Mitton,
2003; Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Le & Tannous, 2016), government contracts (Goldman,
Rochall, & So, 2010) and government aid (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnel, 2006). This
study extends the existing literature by estimating and comparing the effects of state
ownership on the capital structure decisions of firms in selected G-20 economies with
respect to their level of economic development measured in terms of per capita
income (PCI). Our analysis is motivated by a lack of this evidence for such an
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important group of economies. The group, collectively, not only fall in the top 33 glo-
bal economies, but their members also form and constitute G-7, BRIC (Brazil, Russia,
India and China), G-4 (Brazil, Germany and India) and Next-112 (Indonesia, South
Korea and Turkey). Hence, understanding the likely effects of state ownership of
firms on their capital structure decisions for G-20 is extremely important not only
for them but also for other such groups of countries and individual economies at the
same stage of economic development.
Data for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) showing their contributions to an econ-
omy over a period of time are not available. Random reported instances of their con-
tributions show that SOEs accounted for 20% of global investment and 5% of global
employment (Robinett, 2006). The total value of SOEs in Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development economies, having 11G-20 countries, is U.S.$1.2 tril-
lion, accounting for their 15% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 (OECD,
2011). With respect to other countries, the contribution of SOEs to GDP was 15% in
Africa, 8% in Asia, 6% in Latin America (Robinett, 2006), 50% in Central Asia
(Kikeri & Kolo, 2006), and up to 40% in Indonesia (World Bank, 2014). Similarly,
their contribution to a particular sector is even more phenomenal and, in some
instances, could potentially have monopolistic powers. For example, state banks
accounted for more than half of the value of the banking sector in China and India
in 2010 while their value in Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea,
Poland, Russia and Turkey is between 20 and 50% (World Bank, 2014). In China,
India and Russia, about 25% of the top 100 multinational corporations were state-
owned in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2007). Finally, SOEs controlled 75% of the global oil
reserves and production (Economist, 2010). These statistics show state ownership to be
an important economic phenomenon in low-, middle- and high-income countries
including emerging economies. The phenomenon of state ownership, instead of shrink-
ing, has expanded over the years and we are unaware of its role in the capital structure
decisions of firms. In particular, we do not know the likely effects of state ownership
on the capital structure of firms located in lower-middle- and upper-middle-income
countries as compared with high-income countries in G-20 economies. This is the
main focus of the analysis presented in this study. Investigating the likely effects of
state ownership on capital structure in G-20 economies becomes more important since
it is a diverse group and includes two lower-middle-, five upper-middle- and 11 high-
income economies. We not only estimated but also compared the effects of state own-
ership on capital structure decisions across the development spectrum among G-20
economies. Specifically, the following questions are raised in this study:
i. Does state ownership of enterprises affect their capital structure decisions?
ii. Is the effect of state ownership of enterprises on capital structure decisions simi-
lar across the development spectrum?
iii. Are the effects of other firm-specific variables of SOEs and non-SOEs on capital
structure the same across the development spectrum?
While answering these questions, we contribute to the existing literature in the
following ways. First, in addition to examining the effects of some common
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firm-specific variables on capital structure, we estimate the effect of state ownership
on capital structure decisions of selected G-20 countries, a group of diverse econo-
mies. Thus, this study provides empirical evidence from a cross-country study in an
area that has been inadequately researched. Second, this effect is not only estimated
but also compared among lower-middle-, upper-middle- and high-income countries.
Third, specific hypotheses are statistically tested about the effects of firm-specific
variables of SOEs and non-SOEs on capital structure among lower-middle-, upper-
middle- and high-income countries.
The article consists of five sections. An introduction and motivation for this
research have already been presented in Section 1. Section 2 presents a literature
review. The variables used in the analysis and hypotheses about their effects on cap-
ital structure are also presented and defined here. Section 3 presents the methodology
and data. It is followed by the results and their discussion in Section 4. Section 5
presents the conclusions and policy implications.
2. Literature review
There are three main theories of capital structure: trade-off, pecking order and agency
theory. Modigliani and Miller (1958) presented the irrelevance theory, which evolved
to trade-off theory when Myers (1984) violated some of its assumptions. The irrele-
vance theory assumes no taxes, no bankruptcy risks and no liquidation cost.
However, Myers (1984), in his seminal research, added market frictions such as per-
sonal income tax and bankruptcy costs to the theory and showed that optimal debt
occurs at a point where the benefit of debt offsets its cost for a firm. This relationship
is known as trade-off theory. By contrast, due to the existence of information asym-
metry, pecking order theory suggests that managers should prefer internal earnings
first, followed by outside financing and finally equity issuance (Myers & Majluf,
1984). Following the theoretical exposure of capital structure theories, researchers
examined capital structure decisions in both developed (Bauer, 2004; Brounen, Jong,
& Koedijk, 2005; M€orec & Raskovic, 2011; Rajan & Zingales, 1995) and developing
(Achim, Borlea, & Mare, 2016; Bancel & Mittoo, 2004; Pacheco & Tavares, 2016)
countries but ignored G-20 economies as a whole.
Next, pecking order theory is based on an assumption of information asymmetry
between managers and shareholders. Under this theory, firms prefer to utilise internal
financing through retained earnings and are likely to prefer debt over equity financ-
ing if internal funds are inadequate (Chang, Chen, & Liao, 2014; Myers & Majluf,
1984). Finally, agency theory of a firm is viewed as a nexus of contract between prin-
ciple and agent. Jensen (1986) argues that debt financing plays an important role in
the effectiveness and growth of an organisation. It reduces the availability of free cash
flow, which reduces managers spending on their private benefits and thus sharehold-
ers and management are motivated to take part in the organisation affairs to avoid
bankruptcy. Jensen’s reasoning can be applied to the SOEs, as their managers are
found to be more politically connected and can easily engage in corporate perks
within a capital structure having low debt. The relevance of capital structure theory
for state- and non-state-owned enterprises needs to be evaluated in the light of the
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above discussion. This is particularly important for emerging economies, which are
shifting from a more central role of government to a more outward role. Hence, the
question that how state ownership affects the capital structure of enterprises in these
economies with respect to their level of development measured using their per capita
income still needs attention, and this is exactly the scope of this study.
There are several firm-specific variables arising from trade-off, agency and infor-
mation asymmetry theories that help in explaining the capital structure decision of
firms (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001). According to trade-off
theory, the firm targets a debt-to-asset ratio and moves towards it. Specifically, the
movement of a firm’s capital structure towards target debt ratio involves a trade-off
between tax benefit and bankruptcy costs. We expect that these bankruptcy-related
costs have a negative impact on leverage, and one can use the following proxy varia-
bles: tangibility and firm size.
According to pecking order or asymmetric information theories, firms follow a
specific hierarchy in financing new projects, that is, firms prefer internal over external
financing. If internal financing is not sufficient, a firm issues safest security such as
debt, then possibly other hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, etc. The agency
conflicts between the principal and agent evolve due to asset substitution and under-
investment plans. In order to minimise these conflicts, firms with high growth oppor-
tunity prefer equity financing over debt for their new projects. The next sections
discuss the expected roles of various variables in capital structure decisions.
2.1. Leverage
Based on the theories of capital structure presented above, this study considers lever-
age as the dependent variable. Leverage can be defined as the ratio of the book value
of a firm’s total debts to total assets (Graham & Harvey, 2001) or the market value
over book value (Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Frank & Goyal, 2009). This study uses
the first definition of leverage as many managers claim that following equity move-
ments to rebalance capital structure has high adjustment costs. The theory also identi-
fies other exogenous variables, including firm size, profitability, tangibility, growth
(€Oztekin, 2015; Rajan & Zingales, 1995) and state ownership (Dewenter & Malatesta,
2001), that affect capital structure, that is, leverage of a firm.
2.2. State ownership
In a perfect world, ownership of a firm does not matter. The traditional microeco-
nomics theory, under the paradigm of perfect competition, does not consider owner-
ship as an important dimension of a firm for its performance. The absence of
transaction costs in perfect competition eliminates the role of ownership and every
firm is supposed to maximise profit. However, no market is perfect as information
and other asymmetries and externalities, leading to transaction costs, typically exist.
The government intervenes to fix these market failures and imperfections and at
times becomes a culprit of furthering these. However, irrespective of this philosoph-
ical debate, it is observed that government interventions in markets and state
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ownership can be witnessed all over the world irrespective of the development level
of a country.
In imperfect competition along the decreasing average cost curve, given the demand
and marginal revenue functions, economic theory argues against the existence of more
than one firm but government intervention in such natural monopolies on efficiency
grounds. In such situations, agency theory becomes extremely relevant and important to
understand the conflict between principals and agents in the context of a SOE. Wright,
Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng (2005) consider it the replacement of a contract between
private owners and employees with an agency relationship between the state and employ-
ees. The state–employees contract faces incentive issues (Young, Tsai, Wang, Liu, &
Ahlstrom, 2014) and a conflict of principal–agent exists in SOEs (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). During this conflict, the state is the majority shareholder while common citizens
are the minority shareholders, resulting in the tide swinging in the employees’ favour in
the form of incentives at the expense of common citizens. The Economist (2012) reports
that employees of the SOEs feel entitled to help themselves by stealing. There are other
avenues where SOEs are favoured as well. For example, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001)
and Kornai (1980) reported that SOEs can finance new projects at favourable rates or they
can borrow directly from the state without any fear of bankruptcy. If the SOEs fail to
make the project successful central government can rescue the firm via the use of tax-
payers’ money, otherwise the authorities must face a political cost and labour union prob-
lems in the case of bankruptcy. Several studies provide empirical evidence that state
ownership has more advantages than private ownership in terms of efficiency and opti-
mality of capital structure (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; Dong, Liu, Shen, & Sun, 2014;
Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006; Ting & Lean, 2011). However, these studies ignore the
development aspect of the country where SOEs are located. Typically, government institu-
tions are strong in high-income countries, making SOEs more responsible and efficient in
their performance as governments are considered accountable for the use of taxpayers’
money. This may not be the case for low-income countries, where governance as well as
other institutions are weak. This study tests the following hypothesis to understand the
role of ownership in capital structure decisions:
H1: State ownership positively determines leverage of a firm.
In this study, this hypothesis is tested for the selected G-20 economies across the
development spectrum. In particular, we have raised the question whether the rela-
tionship between state ownership and leverage differs across lower-middle-income,
upper-middle-income and high-income countries.
2.3. Tangibility
Tangibility is measured as the ratio of net tangible assets to total assets. Tangible
assets have lower expected distress cost because outsiders can easily value the tangible
assets as compared with intangible assets from an acquisition. Therefore, trade-off
theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and tangibility (Frank &
Goyal, 2009). Contrary to this, pecking order theory postulates an inverse relationship
between tangibility and leverage, since tangibility lowers information asymmetry.
Chang and Wong (2004) find a positive association between tangibility and leverage.
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With respect to trade-off theory, we expect a positive effect of tangibility on leverage
because firms with higher tangible assets reduce the direct costs of bankruptcy as well
as lower the risks of lenders.
2.4. Firm size
The value of assets measures a firm’s size. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and
Fench (2002) argue that larger firms have stable cash flows. These firms are also typ-
ically more diversified, resulting in lower bankruptcy probability. Therefore, trade-off
theory predicts a positive association between size and leverage. This is contrary to
the pecking order theory which envisages a negative association between these due to
less asymmetric information, which makes the firm prefer equity financing instead of
debt. Studies such as Chang et al. (2014), €Oztekin (2015) and Rajan and Zingales
(1995) favour trade-off theory, and a positive effect of size on leverage is hypothesised
in this study as well, given that larger firms are more diversified and have lower
financial distress and bankruptcy costs.
2.5. Profitability
The ratio of earnings exclusive of interest and taxes to total assets is considered prof-
itability. Trade-off theory expects that the use of debt by the firm is followed by
higher profitability as it provides the opportunity for a firm to shield income from
taxation. Agency theory claims that profitable firms can face free cash-flow problems,
and as a result use leverage to control their managers (Jensen, 1986). Hence, the find-
ing of Driffield, Mahambare, and Pal (2005) of a positive association between leverage
and profitability for Indonesia accords with this theory. On the contrary, pecking
order theory suggests that profitable firms have less leverage because they generate
higher cash flows and therefore prefer the use of internal funds (retained earnings)
over debt or equity financing. Studies such as Chang et al. (2014), Jong, Kabir, and
Nguyen (2008) and Pepur, Curak, and Poposki (2016) found a negative association
between profitability and leverage. With respect to information asymmetry, we expect
a negative effect of profitability on leverage, as highly profitable firms will prefer
internal financing over external financing.
2.6. Growth
Growth proxies for investment opportunities and is measured by Tobin’s Q. It is the
ratio of market capitalization to total assets. (Barclay & Smith, 1995). According to
Frank and Goyal (2009), growth opportunity reduces free cash problems, increases
financial distress cost and pushes a higher value to stakeholder co-investment. Thus,
trade-off theory suggests an inverse relationship between growth and leverage; while
according to pecking order theory firms having higher growth should hold more debt
over time keeping profitability constant, suggesting a positive relationship. However,
Lemmon and Zender (2010) supports that firms with higher growth carry less debt
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due to a lower debt capacity. With respect to agency and trade-off theory, we expect
a negative effect of growth on leverage.
2.7. Hypotheses tested
The expected influence of the variables discussed in Sections 2.2–2.6 on the capital
structure decisions is discussed in the light of different but relevant theories.
Individual hypotheses for exploring their role in capital structure decisions are omit-
ted. But the study also tests a number of joint hypotheses to highlight differences
among the selected G-20 countries given the level of economic development of a
country. This is particularly important as G-20 is not a homogeneous group of coun-
tries. In order to highlight the difference across the development spectrum, a joint
hypothesis similar to the one given below is tested for all the variables:
H2: The effect of tangibility of SOEs and non-SOEs is the same on leverage.
Similar joint hypotheses are tested for the other three firm-specific variables in
selected G-20 countries.
The next section discusses the empirical models used in the analysis and how these
models are generated to help test the proposed hypotheses.
3. Methods and data
3.1. Empirical framework
In the light of the discussion presented in the previous section it is postulated that
leverage (L) is determined by tangibility (Ticsy), size (lnAicsyÞ, profitabilityðROAicsy)
and growth (TQicsy) of firm i in country c of sector s in year y. This study focuses on
highlighting differences in state- and non-state-owned enterprises, therefore a dummy
DOics equal to one if a firm is state-owned and zero otherwise is also included in the
model. The empirical model is given as follows:
Licsy ¼ aicsy þ c1Ticsy þ c2lnAicsy þ c3ROAicsy þ c4TQicsy þ c5DOics þ dc þ dy þ ds þ licsy (1)
where dc, ds and dy represent country-, sector- and year-specific fixed effects, ln
represents natural logarithm and licsy represents an error term assumed to be ran-
domly distributed with mean zero and homoscedastic variance. The parameter c5
shows the effect of ownership on the capital structure of a firm. In particular, it is
the intercept shifter of a state-owned firm as compared with the base case of non-
state-owned enterprises. Equation (1) is our base model and statistical significance of
c5 answers the first question raised in the Introduction and tests the first hypothesis.
In order to answer the rest of the two questions, three steps are carried out. First,
dummy variables representing different income-based categories of countries, that is,
lower-middle-income (LMI), upper-middle-income (UMI) and high-income (HI), are
created. Second, these dummies are then interacted with the state-ownership dummy
(DOics) as follows to create dummies representing SOEs and non-SOEs in LMI, UMI
and HI:
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SOELMIics ¼ DOics  LMI
SOEUMIics ¼ DOics  UMI
SOEHIics ¼ DOics  HI
(2)
Hence, SOELMIics is a dummy equal to unity if an ith firm in s industry in a
country c in lower-income countries is state-owned and zero otherwise. Other dum-
mies can be interpreted similarly. These dummies are added to our base model and
the resultant equations are:
Licsy ¼ aicsy þ g1Ticsy þ g2lnAicsy þ g3ROAicsy þ g4TQicsy þ g5SOEHIics
þ dc þ dy þ ds þ licsy (3)
Licsy ¼ aicsy þ g1Ticsy þ g2lnAicsy þ g3ROAicsy þ g4TQicsy þ g5SOEUMIics
þ dc þ dy þ ds þ licsy (4)
Licsy ¼ aicsy þ g1Ticsy þ g2lnAicsy þ gROAicsy þ g4TQicsy þ g5SOELMIics þ dc
þ dy þ ds þ licsy (5)
Equations (3), (4) and (5) are our Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3, respectively.
These models are used to test the effect of state ownership across the developed spec-
trum, providing a complete test of the first hypothesis.
Third, to test the second set of hypotheses for each of the firm-specific variables in
selected G-20 countries and across the development spectrum a further two steps are taken.
In the first step the ownership dummy (DOics) is interacted with each of the firm-specific
variables (tangibility (T), size (lA), profitability (ROA) and growth (TQ)) as follows:
SOETicsy ¼ Ticsy  DOics
SOEAicsy ¼ lAicsy  DOics
SOEROAicsy ¼ ROAicsy  DOics
SOETQicsy ¼ TQicsy  DOics (6)
where SOETicsy, SOEAicsy, SOEROAicsy and SOETQicsy represent tangibility, logarithm
of assets, ROA and Tobin’s Q of state-owned enterprises. Similarly, slope shifters of
the exogenous variables for non-SOEs (NSOETicsy, NSOEAicsy, NSOEROAicsy and
NSOETQicsy) are created and the base model is augmented with these as follows:
Licsy ¼ aicsy þ p1SOETicsy þ p2NSOETicsy þ p3SOElnAicsy þ p4NSOElnAicsy
þ p5SOEROAicsy þ p6NSOEROAicsy þ p7SOETQicsy þ p8NSOETQicsy
þ dc þ dy þ ds þ licsy (7)
This is our Model 4. In the second step, to test the effect of SOEs’ and non-SOEs’
firm-specific variables on leverage in lower-, upper- and higher-income-countries, the
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dummies of development spectrum (SOELMIics, SOEUMIics and SOEHIicsÞ are inter-
sected with each of the exogenous variable following the same process as given in
Equation (6) to slope shifters of each variable for lower- and upper-middle- and
high-income countries. The base model is augmented with these slope shifters and is
called Model 5, given as:
Licsy ¼ aicsy þ k1SOETicsy þ k2NSOETicsy þ k3SOEHTicsy þ k4NSOEHTicsy
þ k5SOEUTicsy þ k6NSOEUTicsy þ k7SOELTicsy þ k8NSOELTicsy þ k9SOElnAicsy
þ k10NSOElnAicsy þ k11SOEHlnAicsy þ k12NSOEHlnAicsy þ k13SOEUlnAicsy
þ k114NSOEUlnAicsy þ k15SOELlnAicsy þ k16NSOELlnAicsy þ k17SOEROAicsy
þ k18NSOEROAicsy þ k19SOEHROAicsy þ k20NSOEHROAicsy þ k21SOEUROAicsy
þ k22NSOEUROAicsy þ k23SOELROAicsy þ k24NSOELROAicsy þ k25SOETQicsy
þ k26NSOETQicsy þ k27SOEHTQicsy þ k28NSOEHTQicsy þ k29SOEUTQicsy
þ k30NSOEUTQicsy þ k31SOELTQicsy þ k32NSOELTQicsy þ dc þ dy þ ds þ licsy
(8)
3.2. Data
This study includes 12 (Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, India,
Indonesia, Russia, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) countries from G-
20 countries. We selected publicly listed state-owned and non-state-owned firms in
these countries. Other countries in the G-20 (Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico,
South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States) were excluded from the sam-
ple because of the unavailability of information on state-owned firms. Annual finan-
cial and accounting data of 252 state-owned and 6503 non-state-owned firms were
extracted from Orbis. Our sample includes a period of five years from 2011 to 2015,
based on the latest available data. Data of the state-owned enterprises before 2011
were only available for a subset of our sample while the data availability of the
selected firms after 2015 became random. The period 2011–2015 provides a balan-
ces panel for all the selected firms, that is, both state and non-state enterprises. We
excluded all the financial enterprise and utility providing firms from our sample
because their debt level is driven by regulation. Therefore, Zhengwei (2013) argues
that the liabilities of such firms are not comparable to the debt liabilities of other
firms. This gets us a sample of 1260 observations of state-owned firms and 32,515
observations of non-state-owned firms.
Following the World Bank, this study classified the selected G-20 countries
into high-income (France, Germany, Italy, Republic of Korea and Saudi Arabia),
upper-middle income (Argentina, Brazil, China, Russia and Turkey) and lower-
middle income (India and Indonesia) countries in order to analyse and compare
the impact of ownership on capital structure decisions of firms in these econo-
mies. Details of the number of firms selected from each country are given in
Table 1.
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4. Results and discussion
Table 2 presents yearly means of leverage, tangibility, profitability, Tobin’s Q and size
of state- and non-state-owned enterprises in all selected G-20 countries. It shows that
on average leverage for all the selected years is significantly higher for state-owned
(56%) as compared with non-state owned (48.3%) enterprises. Among the explanatory
variables the yearly averages of tangibility, profitability and size are significantly
higher for state-owned as compared with non-state-owned enterprises; while the
yearly average of Tobin’s Q is significantly lower for state-owned as compared with
non-state-owned enterprises. On a yearly basis, leverage of state-owned enterprises is
statistically significant and higher than non-state-owned enterprises in all years.
Tangibility and size of state-owned enterprises are statistically significantly higher
than non-state-owned enterprises in all the years while profitability of state-owned
enterprises is significantly higher than non-state-owned enterprises in 2011, 2012 and
2013. Size of state-owned enterprises, measured in terms of the value of assets, is sig-
nificantly higher than non-state-owned enterprises in all years. These results are con-
sistent with and complement results of previous studies; for example, Liu, Tian, and
Wang (2011) show that SOEs in China have higher leverage compared with non-
SOEs. Table 3 shows the correlation between leverage and other firm-specific varia-
bles in the selected G-20 countries. There is a significant correlation between leverage
and other firm-specific covariates. The correlation is positive and statistically
Table 1. The number of state- and non-state-owned enterprises selected in the sample countries.
Country World Bank classification Number of SOEs Number of non-SOEs
Argentina UMI 1 32
Brazil UMI 3 107
China UMI 167 1567
France HI 3 464
Germany HI 6 374
India LMI 28 1983
Indonesia LMI 13 300
Italy HI 1 138
Republic of Korea HI 2 1210
Russia UMI 18 74
Saudi Arabia HI 9 82
Turkey UMI 1 172
All countries 252 6503
Source: Authors calculations using the data describe in section 3.
Table 2. Comparison of means of the variables for selected G-20 countries.
Ownership Years Leverage Tangibility Size Profitability Growth
SOEs 2011 0.558 0.958 14.464 0.066 0.827
2012 0.564 0.953 14.576 0.052 0.75
2013 0.559 0.950 14.678 0.049 0.692
2014 0.558 0.951 14.743 0.041 0.827
2015 0.563 0.949 14.716 0.027 0.975
All 0.560 0.952 14.635 0.047 0.814
Non-SOEs 2011 0.484 0.939 11.923 0.050 0.889
2012 0.486 0.936 12.003 0.042 0.911
2013 0.484 0.935 12.048 0.036 0.980
2014 0.483 0.933 12.071 0.036 1.148
2015 0.479 0.929 12.067 0.034 1.391
All 0.483 0.934 12.022 0.040 1.064
Note: ,  and  show significance at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors calculations.
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significant between size and leverage, while tangibility, profitability and Tobin’s Q are
significantly negatively correlated with leverage. However, the association between
leverage and another variable is estimated without controlling for the effect of other
variables, a limitation removed in regression analysis, discussed next.
There are three main estimation techniques for analysing panel data: fixed effect,
random effect and ordinary least squares (OLS). The typical fixed effect cannot be
applied for estimation since it does not account for time-invariant variables such as
ownership dummy, the main focus of this study. Since this study tests a number of
hypotheses, we use OLS to estimate and compare the effect of ownership on capital
structure decisions across the development spectrum. All the regression models in
our study reveal a good model fit with significant F-statistics and R-squared and
adjusted R-squared.
Each column in Table 4 refers to a different set of regressions. The base model
shows the impact of ownership and other explanatory variables on leverage in
selected G-20 countries. The regression results show that state ownership has a sig-
nificant positive effect on leverage. This contrasts with the results in Table 2, where
the differences in leverage of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises are statis-
tically insignificant. Hence, the effect of state ownership on leverage changes when
the effect of the other exogenous variables is controlled. The model shows that state-
owned enterprises carry 1.3% more debt as compared with non-state-owned enter-
prises and that the ownership does matter. The base model indicates that SOEs are
more levered because of their easy access to loans and other public resources, a find-
ing consistent with other studies (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; Li, Yue, & Zhao,
2009). Among firm-specific variables tangibility and size have a statistically significant
and positive effect, while profitability and growth have a negative effect on leverage.
These results are consistent with the majority of previous studies (Booth et al., 2001;
Fan, Huang, & Zhu, 2008; Jong et al., 2008) and we do not accept the null hypothesis
in respect of these variables. Therefore, in the case of these variables, trade-off theory
stands. Such a positive and statistically significant impact supports the theoretical
proposition that higher tangible assets and firm size helps in reducing the bankruptcy
cost. The negative effect of profitability on leverage yields support for the information
asymmetric theory, implying that a firm prefers internal over external financing. The
negative effect of growth on leverage supports the agency theory, suggesting that a
firm having higher growth opportunities should keep leverage low so that it does not
give up profitable investment opportunities due to wealth transfer from shareholders
to creditors.
Table 3. Correlation matrices, selected G-20 countries.
All selected G-20 countries
Variables Leverage Tangibility Size Profitability Growth
Leverage 1
Tangibility 0.037 1
Size 0.282 0.187 1
Profitability 0.230 0.049 0.119
Growth 0.192 0.032 0.065 0.129 1
Note:  show significance at 99% level, respectively.
Source: Authors calculations.
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Countries are further classified into lower- and upper-middle- and high-income
countries not only to estimate but also to compare the effect of selected exogenous
variables on leverage. Countries are classified according to their per capita income as
per World Bank guidelines (Models 1–3, Table 4). The results show that the effect of
state ownership on leverage is positive and statistically significant in high-income
countries (Model 1), while in lower-middle-income countries its effect is negative and
statistically significant (Model 3). These findings are also consistent with other studies
(Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; Firth, Lin, & Wong, 2008; Nhung & Okuda, 2015). In
high-income countries, state-owned enterprises carry 6.40% more debt than non-
state-owned enterprises, while in lower-middle-income countries, state-owned enter-
prises carry 8.1% less debt than their counterpart. The effect of state ownership on
leverage in upper-middle-income countries is statistically insignificant. The analysis
uses more recent data that considers the liberalisation move of the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund in developing countries. Countries are encouraged to
privatise the state-owned enterprises that have created more inefficiency and losses to
these economies rather than benefits. It is argued that privatisation will lead to more
efficiency gains through addressing the principal–agent problem associated with state
ownership. Hence, over the years governments in the lower-income countries have
reduced the leverage of state-owned enterprises to facilitate their privatisation.
Estimated coefficients of the other determinants of the capital structure show that it
has been positively and statistically significantly affected by tangibility in upper- and
Table 4. The effect of different variables and ownership on leverage estimated using OLS.
Variables
Base Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
G-20 (Selected countries) HI UMI LMI
Tangibility 0.087 0.003 0.132 0.146
(7.600) (0.210) (5.930) (6.190)
Size 0.044 0.033 0.062 0.044
(66.200) (32.330) (39.290) (46.770)
Profitability 0.617 0.498 0.955 0.519
(38.940) (22.740) (25.700) (20.730)
Growth 0.010 0.032 0.002 0.011
(6.500) (7.610) (1.960) (6.670)
SOEs 0.013
(2.270)
SOEs of HI 0.064
(3.290)
SOEs of UMI 0.007
(1.090)
SOEs of LMI 0.081
(5.920)
Constant 0.069 0.185 0.430 0.078
(3.770) (7.250) (11.770) (2.450)
Fixed effects
Country 216.590 89.210 62.950 171.570
Industry 24.170 14.020 22.510 25.750
Year 7.460 1.070 19.050 0.86
Summary statistics
No. of observations 33775 11445 10710 11620
F-statistics 213.500 110.900 102.500 123.600
R-squared 0.241 0.275 0.316 0.248
Adj. R-squared 0.24 0.272 0.313 0.246
RMSE 0.196 0.179 0.183 0.209
Note:  and  show significance at 90 and 99% levels, respectively. All standard errors are robust.
Source: Authors calculations.
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lower-middle-income countries, while it has been positively affected by size in high-,
upper- and lower-middle-income countries. The coefficient of profitability is significantly
negative and consistent with asymmetric information theory regardless the level of
income of a country, indicating that firms with higher profits will prefer internal financing
rather than using debt. The coefficient of growth is negative in all models, supporting the
agency theory. Overall, firms with higher future growth opportunity do not give up profit-
able investment and therefore prefer to have low leverage.
The results for firm-specific determinants of leverage in Table 4 are, however, esti-
mated without the consideration of ownership. An important question arises: do
these determinants of leverage differ with respect to ownership (SOEs vs. non-SOEs)?
Considering classification of countries according to their level of income, we test the
hypothesis that each of these four determinants of leverage for SOEs and NSOEs is
equal using the F-test. The estimates for firm-specific determinants of SOEs and non-
SOEs are provided in Table 5 and the test of the hypotheses is presented in Table 6.
Table 5 shows how the association between firm-specific determinants of capital
structure changes when the ownership structure of a firm changes. Model 4 shows no
change among firm-specific determinants of SOEs and non-SOEs for all the selected
G-20 countries. Size and tangibility of both SOEs and non-SOEs have a statistically
significant positive effect, while profitability and growth of SOEs and non-SOES have
a negative effect on leverage. As the countries’ classification changes according to
level of income, the results of Model 5 do not vary much from the results of Model
4, except that the tangibility of non-SOEs in high-income countries has a significant




G-20 (selected countries) HI UMI LMI
Tangibility of SOEs 0.251 0.177 0.540 0.06
(5.990) (1.210) (9.190) (0.880)
Tangibility of non-SOEs 0.081 0.033 0.107 0.219
(7.040) (2.190) (4.860) (9.610)
Size of SOEs 0.036 0.026 0.039 0.054
(14.170) (3.040) (10.920) (12.030)
Size of non-SOEs 0.044 0.031 0.064 0.046
(66.280) (30.580) (40.740) (48.260)
Profitability of SOEs 1.078 0.464 1.052 1.246
(10.850) (2.450) (8.130) (7.690)
Profitability of non-SOEs 0.598 0.492 0.918 0.516
(37.790) (22.450) (24.600) (20.440)
Growth of SOEs 0.036 0.091 0.040 0.005
(5.000) (4.290) (4.770) (0.720)
Growth of non-SOEs 0.010 0.032 0.002 0.011






No. of observations 33775 33775
F-statistics 207.420 169.300
R-squared 0.243 0.263
Adj. R-squared 0.243 0.262
RMSE 0.195 0.193
Note: ,  and  show significance at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively. All standard errors are robust.
Source: Authors calculations.
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negative effect on the leverage. The negative effect in high-income countries for non-
SOEs reflects lower asymmetric information.
The results pertaining to joint hypotheses are presented in Table 6. For the
selected G-20 countries, the study fails to accept the null hypothesis that the effect of
firm-specific coefficients of SOEs and non-SOEs is the same on leverage. However,
this result changes when countries are classified according to income level. For
example, the effect of all the firm-specific variables on leverage between SOEs and
non-SOEs is the same except growth in high-income countries, while the same is
exactly opposite for lower-middle-income countries. In the case of upper-middle-
income countries, the hypothesis of same effect of exogenous variables on leverage in
SOEs and non-SOEs is only accepted for profitability. These hypotheses tests high-
light the role of size and tangibility in the light of trade-off theory in mitigating bank-
ruptcy costs. The sample for high-income countries includes four developed countries
(France, Germany, Italy and Republic of Korea) having better bond market structure
legal enforcement and protection of creditors compared with other developing coun-
tries included in upper- and lower-middle income countries. These results reflect that
private and public sectors are practising the rule of law in high-income countries,
which may not be the case in upper- and lower-middle-income countries.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
This study has investigated the effect of state ownership on the capital structure deci-
sions of firms in selected G-20 economies. We further categorise these economies
into high-, upper-middle- and lower-middle-income countries using the World Bank
definition. Annual financial and accounting data of 252 state-owned and 6503 non-
state-owned firms for the period 2011–2015 were used in the analysis. We employed
OLS with country, year and industry as fixed effects to estimate the effect of state











16.810 2.080 55.190 5.430
The effect of size of
SOEs and non-
SOEs is the same
on leverage




SOEs is the same
on leverage
22.900 0.020 0.990 19.840
The effect of growth
of SOEs and non-
SOEs is the same
on leverage
12.330 7.520 19.830 0.570
Note: ,  and  show significance at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors calculations.
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ownership on capital structure. Our results indicate that state ownership is positively
associated with leverage in all the selected G-20 countries. These results are in line
with Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and Kornai (1980).
The study also investigated differences between SOEs and non-SOEs across the
development spectrum due to institutional differences in the countries. We conclude
that SOEs in high-income countries carry more debt and in lower-middle-income
countries carry less debt compared with non-SOEs. Dewneter and Maltesta (2001)
and Konrai (1980) found the same trend for high-income countries. We argue that
SOEs’ debt levels should be higher compared with non-SOEs in high-income coun-
tries, as these countries are developed, have strong governance and economic condi-
tions, and provide soft budget constraints to their public enterprises, which may not
be the case in lower-middle-income countries. We also conclude that the effect of
firm-specific variables on capital structure of SOEs and non-SOEs is not the same
across the development spectrum. For example, the effect of tangibility of a SOE on
leverage is different from a non-SOE. Hence, firm-specific variables of SOEs are
inherently different from non-SOEs and their financial behaviour is also different.
Their financial behaviour is more consistent with trade-off and pecking order theo-
ries, but further research is needed to develop a unified theory of SOEs.
Our results provide a number of policy and managerial implications. Similar to
Dewneter and Maltesta (2001) and Konrai (1980), we have shown and learnt that
state ownership is a significant factor affecting a company’s capital structure decision.
However, this association of state ownership with capital structure decision is not the
same across the development spectrum. We observe that state ownership is posi-
tively associated with leverage in high-income countries and the opposite is true for
lower-middle-income countries. The implication is that in countries with a better
legal environment and more stable economic conditions, state-owned enterprises
are likely to take more debt. On the other hand, the negative influence of state
ownership in lower-middle-income countries implies that governance in these
economies is poor and state institutions carry less debt. These institutions could
potentially be used for political purposes and influenced by corrupt practices
(Faccio, 2010). Unlike other studies, we provide evidence that the effect of firm-spe-
cific factors on capital structure decision of state-owned and non-state-owned is not
the same. Also, non-state-owned enterprises lack an incentive to use a debt tax
shield to maximise the benefit to shareholders and therefore a more active financial
leverage strategy can be used to maximise their market value. Hence, one policy
model will not cure all the evils, and separate policy programmes need to be devel-
oped for state and non-state enterprises. While this study has used the available
data of all the state-owned enterprises, not all data are available for all state-owned
firms. Data availability can improve our understanding of the capital structure deci-
sions of state-owned enterprises.
Notes
1. In this study, an enterprise is considered to be state-owned when the state owns more
than half of the shares of the firm.
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2. Next-11 countries constitute a diverse group of emerging economies including Bangladesh,
Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Turkey
and Vietnam.
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